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governments and companies spend on forecasting and 
horizon-scanning regularly fail to predict the occurrence of 
such catastrophes. Although the nature, timing, and probability 
of disruptive events are invariably unknown, history has taught 
us to expect the unexpected. The problem, however, is that the 
frequency and diversity of these unknown events are growing, 
adding to the complexity of forecasting. If precise prediction is 
impossible, then governmental and corporate policy emphasis 
should focus on contingency and mitigation planning. 
Such planning falls into the realm of operational resilience 
and is the primary preserve of central and local authorities, 
commercial enterprises, and the military. De nitions of 
operational resilience vary between these three actors, but 
generally refer to the ability of an organization/community 
to adapt rapidly to disruptive events. Employing a medical 
analogy, the concept can be described as seeking to enhance 
an entity’s immune system. Successful outcomes will depend 
on the imperative of a fast response, facilitated by rigorous 
advanced planning and high levels of responder adaptability. 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to explore the interconnectivity between defense, security, and business, particularly when 
viewed through the prism of operational resilience. The standard stereotype depicts the military acting as a harbinger of 
destruction while business represents the motive force of wealth generation. This is too simplistic, however. Militaries 
 ght wars, but they also make an important contribution to addressing the expanding array of non-traditional threats that 
form part of national security, including wild res,  oods, earthquakes and, of course, pandemics, such as COVID-19. The 
military’s physical resources, attitudinal robustness, and rigorous planning regimes represent three of the more important 
dimensions of military operational resilience. Mutual commercial-military bene ts can be gained via a “two-way” street in 
the adoption of best-practice resilience solutions. There is a recognition that just as military resource managers can learn 
from business, so equally can business learn from the military. The U.K. case is offered to illustrate the principles, policies, 
and practices of military operational resilience.  
OPERATIONAL RESILIENCE 
IN THE BUSINESS-BATTLE SPACE
1. INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic was not predicted, least of all by the 
corporate sector. Yet, pandemics appear with disconcerting 
regularity. Since the beginning of this millennium, the world has 
witnessed outbreaks of H5N1 (Avian Flu), SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome), H1N1 (Swine Flu), EVD (Ebola Virus 
Disease), and MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syndrome). All 
have been contained, but COVID-19 has proved more virulent 
and tenacious. It has caused incalculable social,  nancial, and 
business damage. Most governments, though not all, have 
reacted swiftly to prevent hospitals becoming overwhelmed. 
Societal and economic restrictions have been introduced, yet 
the authorities face a “Hobson’s choice” between lockdowns 
designed to limit the spread of infections but in the process 
destroying economic health (the United Kingdom), and limited 
restrictions to support business and jobs but at the cost of 
medical health (Sweden). Re ecting on the immensity of 
human suffering and economic loss, the casual observer 
might be forgiven for wondering why the millions of dollars 
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The focus is not so much on predictive capability but rather 
on the dynamics of resilience management. The process 
will include progressive processes of planning, integrating, 
executing, and governance to ensure identi cation and 
mitigation of the risks. As argued recently by a senior Bank 
of England of cial: “[Firms should] …be on a WAR footing 
[to] withstand, absorb, recover” [Nelson (2019)]. The three 
principal actors directly affected by civil emergencies will 
have drafted resilience policies to ensure the sustainability of 
services and outputs to minimize the impact on citizens and 
consumers. Government holds the option, when appropriate, 
of inviting military support to ensure appropriate capacity 
is available to address the wide variety of contemporary 
crises. The military is well practiced in responding to multi-
threat scenarios and has proved effective by demonstrating 
high levels of professionalism,  exibility, adaptability, and 
resourcefulness. The military’s support role to business 
is less explicit, but through a long history of mutual civil-
military interaction, bene tting both sides of the relation, it is 
likely that business can learn and adopt best practice 
elements of military operational resilience to strengthen its 
response frameworks. 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to explore and evaluate 
potential lessons for business from military operational 
resilience. In the U.S., the National Guard provides support 
for civil emergencies, as illustrated in deployments that 
include Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the recent Capitol Hill 
disturbances (2021). Notwithstanding the National Guard’s 
operational resilience credentials, the case study for this 
paper is the U.K. This is because over the last two decades 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has crafted a detailed legislative 
model in response to the diverse threats facing British society. 
Additionally, while the National Guard comprises mostly “one 
weekend a month, two weeks a year” reservists, the U.K. 
deploys regular military forces in line with its integrated combat 
and civil resilience posture, placing a relatively heavier burden 
on service personnel. Discussion begins by reference to the 
“business of war”, highlighting the comparable features as 
between combat and competition. Attention then switches to 
examining the military’s expanding portfolio of responsibilities, 
incorporating not only its traditional combat role but also its 
increasing interventions in civil crises and emergencies. 
Invariably, this growth in military responses acts to drain 
exchequer funding, calling into question the affordability of 
military resilience. Hence, the next two sections highlight the 
potential of a two-way street in which the military borrows 
proven commercial techniques from the business community, 
alongside business learning from the military, especially in 
the context of operational resilience, as means of enhancing 
business performance. A conclusions section closes the paper.
2. THE “BUSINESS” OF WAR
Throughout the centuries, defense and business have 
experienced a surprisingly interconnected relationship. The 
two sectors operate at opposite ends of the socio-economic 
spectrum, but while business generates wealth, the military 
seemingly produces little in the way of utilitarian bene t, 
carries a high social opportunity cost, and is focused principally 
on destruction not construction. Yet, notwithstanding these 
negatives, the battle and business space is integrated, 
with defense making important contributions to economic, 
industrial, and technological development. For example, the 
military sector creates highly skilled jobs, provides huge 
numbers of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics) apprenticeship opportunities, generates tax 
revenues and also foreign exchange earnings through export 
opportunities, fosters spin-off innovation, and sustains huge 
numbers of predominantly commercial enterprises in what are 
ostensibly military supply chains. 
There are other integrative features of military and commercial 
supply chains. Apart from the need to continuously invest in 
frontier product and process technologies to keep one step 
ahead of potential competitors (enemies), there is an obvious 
read-across from the military’s rapid and creative responses 
to operational uncertainty and the commercial risks and 
unknowns faced by commercial businesses [Christopher and 
Holweg (2011)]. In peacetime, both defense and business 
supply chains pursue cost-ef cient operations [Yoho et al. 
(2013)] involving common dangers, such as dependence on 
limited suppliers, long lead times,  nancial challenges, large 
inventories, asset visibility, collaboration (coordination among 
nations, executing deployment plans including command, and 
control), and cyber threats. Even though the contemporary civil 
supply chain is more reactive and enjoys faster development 
cycles, the military continues to provide valuable lessons to 
its commercial counterparts. Asymmetric military operations, 
peace support missions, and disaster responses require high 
maneuverability over a broad geographical coverage under 
mostly uncertain conditions [Ancker and Burke (2003)]. The 
defense supply chain consequently operates under tremendous 
pressure to be responsive and sustainable in support of the 
military’s mission. In war, when operational pressures are 
heightened, the business supply chain’s strategic objective of 
maximizing shareholder wealth differs starkly from that of its 
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defense counterpart aimed at maximizing military capability in 
defense of national security. The biggest difference, however, 
is that while disruption in the business supply chain can 
prove costly, problems in the military supply chain can be 
catastrophic, resulting in injuries, destruction, and death [Yoho 
et al. (2013)].
It is clear, then, that the business of war interacts between the 
military and the commercial sector, and vice versa. Yet, though 
the military’s principal objective must always be to defend 
national interests, in recent decades its role has expanded 
to encompass security objectives beyond solely combat 
tasks. Planning against the prospect of war is challenging 
as it requires numerous assumptions and involves scenario 
planning and judgments on future weapons capabilities of 
friend and foe alike. Yet, in the present climate of expanded civil 
threats, the risks and responsibilities of military contingency 
planning are magni ed.
3. RESILIENCE, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
‘UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS’ 
Military resilience in the 21st century is no longer con ned 
to combat. There has been a remarkable expansion in the 
threats facing global society, massively increasing uncertainty. 
The challenge of identifying and forecasting these threats was 
aptly summarized by Donald Rumsfeld during his February 
2002 U.S. Government brie ng on the lack of evidence 
linking Iraq with the supply of weapons of mass destruction 
to terrorist groups, stating: “... as we know, there are known 
knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are 
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know” 
[Graham (2014)]. 
Rumsfeld’s statement was focused on the threat of potential 
aggression, but its application has wider relevance. In 
the West, in earlier times, national security equated with 
military defense. In other words, the military’s sole purpose 
was the defense of the realm. However, the contemporary 
understanding of national security has evolved, and is now 
interpreted to have broader application, with defense just one 
of a potpourri of different security considerations. The notion 
of a broadened security framework is not novel, and dates 
back to Japan’s mid-19th century cultural conceptualization 
of “comprehensive security”. Factors such as macroeconomic 
growth, technological advancement, political stability, and 
diplomatic power were viewed as equal components of 
military strength within an expanded de nition of national 
security. Japan has recently re ned this framework to highlight 
additional non-traditional threats to national security, including 
earthquakes (Kobe, 1995), terrorism (Tokyo underground 
Sarin chemical attack, 1995), pandemics (SARS, 2003), and 
tsunamis (Tohoku, 2011). Other states have emulated Japan’s 
comprehensive national security model, including Singapore 
and Malaysia (both using the concept of total defense). 
Belatedly, Western states have similarly begun to rede ne 
national security as going beyond simply military security 
and embracing socio-economic stability. Britain’s Defence 
Doctrine, for instance, emphasizes that political stability, 
economic buoyancy, and environmental health coalesce into 
a holistic national security framework. The Doctrine considers 
the military capacity to support civil authorities in responding 
to non-combat threats. Indeed, the experience of the last two 
decades demonstrates that the military’s interventionist role 
has ratcheted up, pari passu, with the increased number and 
diversity of civil emergencies. Figure 1 illustrates this military 
operational “creep” in response to the security environment’s 
rising complexity. Military operational responsibility is now 
categorized into two forms of security, one traditional and 
the other non-traditional. Traditional security centers on 
the military’s principal historic duty of protecting territorial 
integrity. Today, this incorporates not only conventional but 
also unconventional con ict; the latter comprising three 
types of threat:  rstly, nuclear, biological, radiological and 
chemical warfare (NBRC); secondly, asymmetrical con ict, 
principally terrorism by non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, 
operating across Africa and Asia, the Taliban (Afghanistan), 
Isis (Middle East), Boko Haram (Nigeria and West Africa), and 
al-Shabaab (East Africa and Mozambique); and thirdly, hybrid or 
“grey zone” war, covering disinformation, cyber attacks, and 
covert operations. 
Non-traditional security, by contrast, refers to threats devoid of 
military origins, but where the military can make a signi cant 
contribution to mitigating the threat’s impact. Here, the military 
has two roles. Firstly, at the national level, it can be deployed 
at the behest of government to strengthen civil resilience 
against  ooding, wild res, animal infection (such as “mad 
cow” disease), and of course, endemics/pandemics. Secondly, 
at the international level, the military can respond to three 
broad threats: natural disasters, such as humanitarian relief 
operations dealing with the destructive forces of hurricanes 
and volcanic eruptions; human-induced disasters, including, 
for instance, con ict-stabilization, peacekeeping, and post-
con ict reconstruction operations; and, illegal activities, such 
as drug-running, piracy, and illegal  shing. Finally, there are 
certain global non-traditional threats that do not include the 
military, not yet at least. These re ect a growing securitization 
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process that has become increasingly institutionalized, with 
governments adopting international agreements to collectively 
address emerging human security threats embracing the 
negative impacts of climate change, pollution, and  nite 
energy and food resources.  
Figure 1 highlights the challenges facing the government and 
the military, explicitly, and the business community, implicitly, 
given that all stakeholders will be affected by the socio-
economic dislocation of disasters. The policy response has 
been the emergence of what is termed “operational resilience”, 
highlighting the importance of engaging in contingency planning 
to address, as far as possible, the range of known-knowns, 
unknown-knowns, and unknown-unknowns. De nitions of 
operational resilience between stakeholders display only 
nuanced differences. Business operational resilience, for 
instance, is usually de ned as the ability of an organization’s 
systems and processes to adapt rapidly to changing 
environments and to continue to operate in the event of 
disruptive events [Husband (2019)]. More speci cally, in 
the context of cyber attacks on  nancial services, business 
resilience has been de ned as the need to address systemic 
risks, including increasingly complex digital ecosystems where 
disruptive viruses operate. The necessary corporate responses 
re ect a journey of continuous improvement, taking in the 
spectrum of management disciplines that cover governance, 
strategy, information security, change management, and 
disaster recovery [Kilfeather et al. (2019)]. 
In similar fashion, the U.K. Government interprets operational 
resilience as the ability of the community, services, and 
areas of infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, 
to withstand, handle, and recover from disruptive challenges 
[MoD (2017)]. The civil protection policy framework for 
preparation and response to emergencies derives from the 
2004 Civil Contingencies Act. It has three strategic objectives: 
 rstly, protect human life, and, as far as possible, property and 
the environment, and alleviate suffering; secondly, support the 
continuity of everyday activity and restore disrupted services 
at the earliest opportunity; and, thirdly, uphold the rule of 
law and the democratic process [Cabinet Of ce (2013)]. The 
provisions of the 2004 Act were strengthened by the 2015 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (SDSR). Here, the notion of community 
resilience was highlighted, considered to be achievable 
through improving the crisis management architecture. 
Yet, not all crises and emergencies are “slow-burn” disasters 
that allow time for considered institutional responses. For 
those that are not foreseeable, the government’s aim has 
been to identify and mitigate the risk as far in advance as 
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Figure 1: The military’s role in support of security
Source: authors











possible through  ve-year NSS-SDSR reviews. Classi ed 
assessment of risks the U.K. is likely to face  ve years into 
the future are undertaken, enabling high-level categorization 
and prioritization of imminent risks, as well as the design of 
appropriate responses, bounded by resource availability, to 
eliminate, reduce, or mitigate the effects of a risk or reduce 
the probability of its occurrence [MoD (2017)]. As part of the 
Ministry of Defence’s contribution to the security mandate, 
the military, via MACA (military aid to the civil authorities), 
stands ready to support as an essential element of community 
resilience. The U.K. military has a strong record of offering 
generalist and niche capabilities at times of real and potential 
crisis, including repatriation of stranded U.K. citizens caused 
by the Icelandic ash cloud (2010), enhanced security at the 
London Olympics (2012), mitigation of the effects of serious 
national  ooding (2015-16), and generalist and specialist 
medical support during the present COVID-19 pandemic 
(2020-21).
There are different de nitions of military resilience dependent 
on the context in which it is applied. At the individual level, 
there is medical resilience de ned as the capacity to overcome 
the negative effects of setbacks and associated stress on 
military performance and combat effectiveness [Kilfeather 
et al. (2019)]. At the national level, the MoD uses the U.K. 
government’s interpretation of resilience, cited earlier in this 
section. Finally, at the NATO Alliance level, resilience re ects 
the need to resist and recover from a major shock, such as a 
natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or 
armed attack, combining both civil preparedness and military 
capability [NATO (2020)]. NATO  rmly anchors the principle 
of operational resilience to Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding 
treaty. The Article traditionally focuses on the Alliance’s 
collective capacity to resist armed attack but is now interpreted 
more broadly to include member countries’ responsibility 
to be suf ciently robust and adaptable in supporting the 
entire spectrum of crises envisaged by the Alliance. NATO 
con rms the thematic that today’s security environment is 
unpredictable, with threats arising from state and non-state 
actors, including terrorism and other asymmetrical threats, 
including cyber attacks and hybrid warfare, blurring the lines 
between conventional and non-conventional forms of con ict. 
NATO’s threat assessment also embraces climate change 
and natural disasters, such as  oods,  res, earthquakes, and 
biohazards, and again the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Although the various de nitions of operational resilience are 
similar, policy implementation between the principal actors may 
diverge. Business operates in a competitive, and thus often 
isolated and insular, environment, with organizations jealously 
guarding policies that might provide competitive advantage. 
By comparison, central and local governmental authorities act 
cooperatively with the armed forces to construct and reinforce 
resilience. In some immature undemocratic states, military 
juntas govern, but under normal Western parliamentary 
conditions, the military is subordinate to government. Here, 
the norm is for government to recognize the importance and 
correlation of resilience alongside military security, adopting 
an integrated approach when addressing civil contingencies. 
In the U.K., the principal military raison d’être remains that of 
responding to armed threats, but its wider role of responding 
to civil crises and emergencies has become legally enshrined. 
For example, in January 2021, the Johnson government 
formally requested operational deployment of over 5,000 
of Her Majesty’s regular and reservist military personnel in 
support of the COVID-19 response, representing the country’s 
biggest peacetime home operation [Whipple (2021)]. Army, 
naval, and air-force personnel were assigned to three principal 
 elds of operation: testing, including working with schools and 
establishing testing sites for British and Continental hauliers 
crossing the English Channel; vaccine, involving not only 
delivery but also the use of military medics to administer the 
vaccine; and logistics, with over 200 military planners poised 
to assist with organizational and logistical problems as the 
vaccine program expands [Whipple (2021)]. 
The professionalism the armed forces display in the 
performance of their duties against a wide diversity of threats 
is explained by the inherent nature of the military, including 
discipline, rigorous training, a “can-do” mentality, and the 
dynamics of feeding back accumulated operational experience 
to continuously re ne and improve resilience strategies. Yet, 
in effectively ful lling operational responsibilities, a common 
hurdle all militaries face is the adequacy of resourcing. The 
U.K. Ministry of Defence, for example, is planning to spend 
£183.6bn in the next decade, but is already £2.9bn over 
budget, and if all the identi able risks materialize, then the 
budgetary shortfall in the 2019 to 2029 equipment plan 
would balloon to £13bn [Sabbagh (2020)]. Under such an 
eventuality, costs will necessarily have to be tailored to secure 
budgetary balance, and inevitably civil-military capabilities will 
be negatively affected. However, a responsible and prudent 
budgetary process is not simply about cutting costs, it also 
concerns managing scarce defense resources more ef ciently. 
In pursuit of this goal, the U.K. military has acknowledged the 
need to borrow best practice commercial techniques from the 
business community.
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4. CORPORATE FINANCIAL RESILIENCE: 
LESSONS FOR THE MILITARY 
The military’s conventional cash accounting approach has been 
to receive the annual parliamentary-voted defense budget 
and then to spend it. Since the beginning of the millennium, 
however, unrelenting funding pressures have heralded the 
need for a smarter  nancial model. Funding sources were, 
and continue to be, stretched due to increasingly complex, 
R&D-intensive, and hence, expensive weapons systems. 
Acquisition cost escalation is compounded by the reluctance 
of public opinion to commit to the associated high opportunity 
cost of increased defense spending given what is arguably 
a benign strategic environment. As a result, most advanced 
military states have extensively reformed their defense  nance 
systems to closely control, monitor, and plan expenditure. 
Commercial  nancial and management methodologies have 
been applied to defense, though invariably adapted to suit the 
unique environment in which the military operates. The U.K. 
Ministry of Defence has launched several  nancial reforms, 
including devolved budgeting and what has come to be called 
the “business case”. The latter is a management tool that 
the Ministry of Defence uses to support decision-making on 
competing military investment opportunities [MoD (2014)]. 
This is deemed essential because the Ministry of Defence 
spends huge amounts of its defense budget (£37 billion in 
2019-20) on investment opportunities (£12.7 billion), and 
rigorous  nancial appraisal, employing discounted cash  ow 
techniques, is required to ensure that it makes best use of 
its limited resources [MoD (2020)]. Two other commercial 
 nancial methodologies have been transplanted into an 
alien public sector and are examined in greater detail. The 
 rst, “resource accounting and budgeting”, has proved to 
be a valuable performance instrument for the Ministry of 
Defence, while the second, the “defense” balanced scorecard, 
was found to be ill-suited to the unique demands of the 
military context. 
4.1 Resource accounting and budgeting
When it comes to reporting  nancial transactions in defense, 
there are two methods: one is traditional cash-based and the 
other is accruals-based accounting. Cash accounting is simple, 
but came at a cost, i.e., there is no recognition of assets and 
liabilities. For instance, committed future expenditures, such 
as lease payments and nuclear decommissioning costs, were 
not recorded as liabilities. The cash regime records them as 
expenditures only when payments are actually made at some 
point in the future. Due to this, and other weaknesses, the 
interests of (future) taxpayers were not accurately represented 
via the traditional public sector cash accounting system. This 
downside of cash accounting was recognized by the U.K. 
Government in the 1990s, when dramatic declines in the 
quality and quantity of public sector assets became apparent 
[HM Treasury (2001)]. It was felt that better cost accounting 
information was needed to reverse this trend, and, accordingly, 
the government adopted the accruals accounting system 
across the public sector, formerly the preserve of the business 
community [Heald (2005)]. The public version of accruals 
was called “resource accounting and budgeting” (RAB). The 
Ministry of Defence adopted RAB in two stages. The  rst, 
spanned three years, from 1998 to 2001, with the Ministry of 
Defence producing both cash-based and RAB-based  nancial 
accounts. The second, from 2002 onwards, was re ected by 
the Ministry of Defence abandoning cash-based accounting 
altogether and using only RAB-based accounts [Heald 
(2005)]. The three-year transition period allowed the Ministry 
of Defence to train staff in accruals accounting, seeking to 
overcome any teething problems that the new system created. 
The adoption of RAB in the Ministry of Defence was more than 
just a technical switch from cash to accruals, it also required 
a change in cultural mindset, from a narrow cash lens to an 
all-inclusive view of  nancial transactions. 
Under RAB, the full consequences of economic activities are 
accountable, enabling more accurate  nancial reporting. The 
underlying principle of RAB is that the Ministry of Defence 
records defense expenditures not when payments are made 
but when bene ts from expenditures are received. This 
offers superiority over the cash regime in that liabilities are 
recognized and hence the interests of (future) taxpayers 
are more accurately presented. RAB also offered not just 
transparency but  ner granularity of defense outlay. For 
instance, on publication of the  rst stand-alone RAB Report 
(2001-02), the Ministry of Defence discovered that its use of 
external consultants cost more at £559mn than the £465mn 
bill for the Royal Marines [MoD (2002)]. Moreover, RAB rightly 
makes a distinction between current and capital defense 
expenditures (assets); something which the cash regime failed 
to do. For example, the Ministry of Defence’s assets, including 
warships, submarines, main battle tanks, and  ghter aircraft, 
suddenly became subject to depreciation charges to re ect 
the cost of bene ts received from the assets over their lives. 
This meant that for the  rst time, the Ministry of Defence had 
become incentivized to make optimal use of its assets, and 
to dispose of idle assets since holding would incur depreciation 
charges. In 2019, these charges accounted for about 
15 percent of the Ministry of Defence’s annual expenditures 
[MoD (2020)]. 
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As in business, depreciation charges on Ministry of Defence 
assets may promote inappropriate behavior through seeking 
short-term gains against longer-term losses. Thus, when 
the defense budget is tight, it may be tempting to dispose 
of defense assets (to save depreciation charges) only to be 
bought later, when strategic circumstances change, at much 
higher costs than before. Additionally, depreciation charges 
are based on  nancial values of assets, which are easier to 
determine in a business context than when faced with a military 
threat. The value of business assets can be determined by 
market price. However, due to the unique nature of specialized 
military hardware, an active primary and secondary market 
is constrained. Hence, defense depreciation charges for such 
assets are based on estimates and may be  awed. Moreover, 
research and development (R&D) costs, representing a 
signi cant component of defense budgets, can either be 
classed as current or capital expenditure. The consequences 
of this classi cation on the defense budget and the Ministry 
of Defence’s annual accounts are profound. In the absence of 
de ned rules on how Ministry of Defence  nancial transactions 
are reported, consistency over time and comparability of RAB-
based  nancial information become challenging. Commercial 
organizations face the same challenge, but mature accounting 
standards have overcome the problem by forcing businesses 
to report  nancial transactions.
4.2 The defense balanced scorecard
One way of improving business performance is by measuring 
and monitoring a wide range of organizational goals, beyond 
those solely  nancial. Yet, the greater the number of business 
goals, the greater the danger of information overload, and 
hence managerial complexity. A way round this problem is the 
adoption of the “balanced scorecard” framework developed 
by Kaplan and Norton almost three decades ago [Kaplan and 
Norton (1992)]. This strategic management tool enables top 
management to obtain a quick and comprehensive view of 
business performance in meeting a range of performance 
targets. As the name suggests, the balance scorecard forces 
management to take a balanced focus on four important and 
complementary metrics to ensure that the business remains 
on track to success. The scorecard is a living document, 
reviewed regularly, to provide con dence that management 
efforts are in sync with the dynamic and constantly evolving 
commercial environment. The military environment is equally 
uncertain and laced with arguably even greater risk. Indeed, 
in the 1990s the U.K. Ministry of Defence was reportedly 
monitoring over 100 strategic objectives, but with performance 
reports neither timely nor robust for accurate decision-making 
[NAO (2001)]. As a consequence, the Ministry of Defence 
introduced a tailored version of the balanced scorecard to 
improve defense performance management. The “defense 
balanced scorecard” (DBSC) was born, such that Kaplan and 
Norton’s four performance parameters ( nancial, internal 
process, customer, and organizational capacity) were 
mapped across to the Ministry of Defence’s top four strategic 
objectives: 1) purpose, overcoming current challenges and 
being ready for tomorrow’s tasks; 2) enabling processes, 
transforming the Ministry of Defence into a high-performing 
organization; 3) future capabilities, building for future success; 
and 4) resources, ensuring that defense resources are 
optimally used. 
The DBSC enabled the Ministry of Defence to monitor past, 
current, and future performance against 16 metrics gauging 
progress towards achieving the strategic objectives [NAO 
(2001)]. Performance against each of the objectives was 
analyzed on a quarterly basis to inform and enable the Ministry 
of Defence to make adjustments to strategic direction, military 
priorities, and consequent resource reallocation. In the early 
years, the Ministry of Defence hailed the DBSC a success 
story [MoD (2004)]. Despite this positive endorsement, the 
scorecard exhibited weaknesses. For example, the Ministry of 
Defence’s outputs (such as war operations) were the result of 
joint efforts with other departments. In such circumstances, 
deciding on the proportion of outcomes derived as a direct 
result of Ministry of Defence efforts proved problematical 
[Tomlyn (2005)]. Moreover, it was discovered that tactical 
consequences from tactical actions failed to feature in the 
DBSC, since the latter only measured performance and impact 
at the strategic level [Tomlyn (2005)]. Tellingly, while the DBSC 
served its purpose in peace time, it did not provide an easy 
performance management “ t” in war, as evidenced during 
the U.K. military’s intense Iraqi and Afghanistan operational 
engagements by regular and counter-insurgency forces [Taylor 
(2012)]. The Ministry of Defence’s principal focus was on the 
success, or lack of it, in these campaigns, and the search 
for appropriate performance metrics proved distractingly 
elusive, especially when accommodating assessments of 
combat deaths and casualties.1 The revealed weaknesses 
in measuring military operational performance sealed the 
defense scorecard’s fate, and after almost a decade of use, it 
was abandoned in 2010.
1  E-mail correspondence with Professor Trevor Taylor, February 4, 2021.
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5. MILITARY OPERATIONAL RESILIENCE: 
LESSONS FOR BUSINESS 
Military preparedness aims to deter and defeat hostile threats 
to the country’s territorial integrity and national interests. 
Combat, however, often occurs in what is described as the 
“fog of war”, where lines of communication are nonexistent 
and command and control, reconnaissance, surveillance, 
and intelligence are severely impaired. This means that the 
battle eld environment is volatile, uncertain, complex, and 
ambiguous (VUCA) [Nindl et al. (2018)]. It is not only the 
military “teeth-end” that is impacted, but also the important 
support infrastructure. Military operational resilience must, 
therefore, embrace IT systems, logistics, supply chain, and 
people skills, re ecting the softer elements of what the 
military refer to as “left of bang” requirements [Roepke et al. 
(2019)]. The Armed Forces are trained to respond to hostile 
and unpredictable events, and hence offer lessons for the 
strengthening of business resilience in the face unpredictable 
multi-threat scenarios, often under similar VUCA-type 
conditions. In this regard, several lessons stand out, including 
the absolute commitment to defeat the enemy through 
military  ghting power, the role of delegated authority to 
foster  exibility, adaptability, and creativity, and the continuous 
pursuit of rigorous and dynamic planning in response to the 
one constant, change. 
5.1 Fighting power
The resilience of the British Army is held to be the foundation 
of its capabilities. It exists primarily to  ght and win battles, 
driven by the realization that there are no prizes for coming 
second. Thus, the Army holds a preoccupation with training 
to win, though, in the event of failure, to also brutally analyze 
what went wrong. This “resilience” is articulated in terms of 
structure and agency and is embodied in the Army’s Doctrine 
Land Operations (2017). The Doctrine determines output 
to be “ ghting power”, which is comparable to a business’ 
end-product, in the sense of representing the culmination of 
design and raw material conversion through manufacturing 
processes. A similar comparison can also be drawn with 
the lexicon of business, which borrows extensively from the 
military. Indeed, some authors have gone so far as to argue 
that the in ux of military terms into everyday business usage, 
such as “campaigns”, “con icts”, “targeting”, “price wars”, 
and “hostile takeovers”, is not so much about exploiting 
the power of metaphors or similes in the competitive battle 
being waged, but rather as a symbolic expression of the 
psychological emasculation executives feel from not having 
served in the military [Mellor (2018)]. 
The military’s  ghting power constitutes both real (physical) 
and ethereal (conceptual and moral) components. The subtle 
blending together of each of these components provides a 
helpful intellectual mosaic for analyzing the character and 
success of both military and commercial organizations. 
Fighting power can be decomposed into its respective aims 
and attributes, as shown in Table 1. While each of the three 
components is crucial to the generation of  ghting power, the 
primary component or secret ingredient that gives the Army, 
and arguably commercial entities, the edge, representing the 
foundation of its resilience, is the “force multiplier” moral 
component. As Napoleon Bonaparte once famously stated: “In 
war, three-quarters turns on personal character and relations; 
the balance of manpower and materials counts only for the 
remaining quarter” and further speci ed as: “in war the moral-
is-to-the-physical as three-is-to-one” [Bonaparte (1808)]. 
Consequently, it is the moral component of a military force that 
most occupies its leaders, followed by the conceptual and the 
physical. In the British Army, as in all other armies, including 
that of the U.S., it is the physical component that devours 
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Table 1: Components of  ghting power
COMPONENT TYPE PURPOSE ATTRIBUTES
Physical component The means to  ght Manpower, equipment, training and collective performance, sustainability, and resources.
Conceptual component How to  ght An understanding of how to operate, including the  exibility to adapt.
Moral component How to get subordinates to  ght Morale, leadership, and ethical foundation.
Source: British Army Doctrine Land Operations (2017)
Note: High morale enables the land force to  ght and overcome the privations of con ict. Moral cohesion contributes to this success, providing a sense of shared 
identity and purpose that binds individuals into teams, and teams into effective  ghting forces. Moral cohesion is sustained by shared values and standards that guide 
the actions of every soldier. 
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most of the defense budget, but paradoxically is the least-
best resourced. Accordingly, British soldiers take comfort and 
inspiration in equal measure from Napoleon’s wisdom. The 
conceptual and moral components of  ghting power constitute 
the building blocks of military operational resilience but would 
be ineffective in the absence of inspirational leadership and 
rigorous planning. Combined, these factors might also provide 
the managerial apparatus for invigorating the culture of a 
business driven by the search for competitive success. 
The military views  ghting power, distributed leadership, and 
planning as vital for tactical and strategic success, and in this 
sense, the military is ahead of business in the development of 
resilience to address unforeseen events. As in the military, so 
it should be in business. The moral responsibility of everyone 
is not to just work hard, but to secure the overarching mission 
through unity in commitment and purpose.
5.2 Distributed leadership
The overarching leadership philosophy employed by the 
British Army is called “mission command”, supporting both 
the moral and conceptual components. It was designed and 
deployed in the 1980s to enable rapid decision making in 
order to seize the initiative in the  uid and complex battles 
anticipated from a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Mission 
command was based on the German command philosophy 
of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics), a mainstay of tactics since 
Germany’s ignoble defeat by Napoleon in the 19th Century. 
Indeed, the philosophy was exempli ed in the Blitzkrieg 
operations conducted with astonishing speed and military 
force during the opening phase of WWII operations in Poland, 
Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France. The British Army’s 
use and adaption of Auftragstaktik led to a refocus from the 
plan for battle and centralized control, institutionalized by 
General Montgomery, to, instead, an emphasis on achieving 
the mission or aim. Importantly, the initial plan would be 
extemporized to suit changing events at all levels of command 
with coherence achieved through an absolute responsibility on 
achieving the intent of the senior commander. 
The guiding principles of mission command are threefold. 
Firstly, the absolute responsibility to achieve the superior 
commander’s intent through unity of effort. The “absolute 
responsibility to achieve the superior commander’s intent” 
underscores the ingrained sense of sel ess commitment to 
the mission that characterizes the British Army’s approach. 
It is sometimes called the “can do attitude”, though possibly 
more appropriately described as the “will to do attitude”. 
This can/will do attitude is underscored and reinforced by 
the moral component of  ghting power: morale, leadership, 
and ethical foundation. Secondly, is the need for freedom of 
action within speci ed and implied constraints. While frontline 
commanders are given clear objectives, they are also allowed 
a generous amount of freedom in order to achieve them. In 
fact, the ideal command structure is not a rigid hierarchy but 
a sphere where the core sets the culture and the parts of the 
Table 2: The Estimate
STAGES TASK PROCESS
1 Mission analysis
What must be achieved, and what are the constraints of action? The central question of “mission analysis” 
is “has the situation changed” and this is asked and re-asked throughout the Estimate, and during the 
execution of the plan. If, at any time, the answer is yes, then all previous planning may be nugatory. 
Inculcating this questioning mindset into military personnel is a critical element of British army resilience 
and capability.  
2 Evaluation of factors
This process refers to the systematic and repetitive assessment of strategic variables impacting on the 
“situation”, covering the spectrum from the nature of the enemy, environmental considerations (including 
ground and weather), support from friendly forces (including logistical), tactical surprise, security and time 
boundaries, to softer considerations, such as softer diplomatic and politico-economic  in uences as well 
as informational  ow and media constraints, including the omnipresent public relations CNN factor. 
3
Consideration of 
courses of action 
(COA)
The essentiality of constituting a diverse planning group to identify and explore the range of operationally 
viable courses of actions and analyzing their advantages and disadvantages in relation to the mission. 
Importantly, the most promising courses of actions are “war gamed” or “red teamed” to determine the 
resources required and risks involved. 
4 Commander’s decision
This is the logical result of the Estimate, whereby the commander decides, or develops, one of the courses 
of actions in comparison with the opposing force’s likely course of action. The decision constitutes the 
basic directive that guides the planning of future actions. The questioning incorporated into the mission 
analysis as to whether the situation has changed, continues to be asked. 
Source: Land Operations (2017, Annex 8B)
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organization at the edge are free to react to events outside 
them: centralized command and decentralized execution [The 
Economist (2020)]. The principles of mission command are a 
tried and tested British Army variant of what the leadership 
literature describes as “distributed leadership”. While the 
mission aim is all consuming, commanders are expected to 
demonstrate  exibility and adaptability in decision-making. 
An evolutionary process exhorted by Charles Darwin and 
Leon Megginson, who famously showed that the species best 
able to adapt and adjust to a changing environment is the 
species that will prevail, not the strongest nor most intellectual 
[Nindl et al. (2018)]. Thirdly, is the crucial importance attached 
to trust, mutual understanding, and timely and effective 
decision-making. 
The lesson for business is clear: while it is essential to 
understand the leader’s intent, creativity should be encouraged 
and viewed as a learning process, knowing that failure will not 
be rewarded, but nor will it be penalized. Trust is vital, where, 
in any caring organization, diversity is encouraged, with the 
message that people matter communicated unequivocally 
through clear and unambiguous signaling. Sun Tzu, the 
revered Chinese military strategist, endorsed this approach 
when he wrote over 2,000 years ago “regard your soldiers as 
your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys” 
[Caballero (2020)].
5.3 Targeted planning
The  nal dimension of the “business-battle space” model is 
planning. The British Army’s planning tool designed to exploit 
military capability and strengthen resilience is called the 
“Estimate”, being used as the “formal” estimate when time is 
suf cient, or as the “combat” estimate when time is pressing. 
The Estimate’s philosophical approach derives directly from 
Helmuth von Moltke (Chief of the Prussian General Staff, 
1871-1888). He is regarded as the father of the previously 
mentioned Auftragstaktik – a command system based on 
the premise, famously articulated by Moltke in 1880, that 
“no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond 
the  rst contact with the main hostile force” [Moltke (1880)]. 
Flexibility and adaptability are sine qua non for success, and 
in this respect the military are ahead of business in how it 
delegates and factors in contingencies for unforeseen events 
[The Economist (2021)]. A similar sentiment was echoed in 
1950 by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, drawing 
upon his experiences as a soldier, opined: “Plans are nothing; 
planning is everything” [Galambos (1984)]. Thus, the Estimate, 
whether formal or combat/tactical, enables actions to begin, 
based on an “estimate of the situation” at the time, and leads 
to a course of action (plan). The Estimate broadly consists of 
four stages, as outlined in Table 2. 
The Estimate represents both a guidance methodology and 
an intellectual exercise, especially at the middle (operational) 
or higher (strategic) levels, but also applicable at the lower 
(tactical) level. It engages with what is referred to as a “center 
of gravity analysis”, de ned as the bundle of characteristics, 
capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a 
military force, or other grouping derives its freedom of action, 
physical strength, or will to  ght. The military planner seeks to 
protect its own center of gravity whilst trying to unbalance or 
destroy that of the opposition. The signi cance of this military 
contest is symbolized by an interchange between U.S. Colonel 
Harry Summers and a senior North Vietnamese of cer, General 
Vo Nguyen Giap: the former stating: “You know, you never 
defeated us on the battle eld,” and the latter responding, 
“While that is true, it is also irrelevant” [Summers (1981)]. 
The Americans did not protect their own center of gravity (will 
of the people), which ultimately led to Washington withdrawing 
from Vietnam. For the Americans, the progress of the war 
might be characterized as a series of Pyrrhic victories,2 but for 
the Vietnamese, it was more about astutely identifying that the 
war’s center of gravity was the will of the two populations to 
withstand human loss. 
While the importance of planning is recognized by both the 
military and business, companies have recently become over-
enamored with the concept of predictive analytics, trying to 
make precise forecasts about the direction of markets. Instead, 
they should engage in wargaming, because the greater the 
focus on hypotheticals, the less space there is for “unknown 
unknowns”. Senior managers need to relinquish authority and 
allow juniors to make decisions. Companies should encourage 
those at the sharp end of the business to be  exible, adaptive, 
and responsive. In a crisis, companies that have invested in 
building up leaders at the lowest ranks of the organization are 
more likely to survive and (ultimately) prosper. In business, as 
in con ict, it is not the generals who carry the burden of war; 
it is the troops [The Economist (2020)].
2  Coined to refl ect the victories of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, which were gained only at the expense of suffering heavy losses in defeating the Romans at 
Asculum in Apulia in 279 BC.
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6. CONCLUSION 
The military’s interpretation of operational resilience focuses 
on two elements within national security. The  rst is concerned 
with “traditional” security, aimed at protecting the country’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The second centers on 
“non-traditional” security, where the armed forces contribute 
expertise and resources in support of the civilian authorities 
to address wider economic, health, and natural threats. The 
military deals in uncertainty, engaging in wargaming of differing 
strategic scenarios, while businesses are pre-occupied with 
constructing risk and probability models in the elusive search 
for precise forecasts of future uncertain events. The military 
is ahead of business in how it trains, devolves, and plans for 
unforeseen events, nurturing the ethereal components of 
self-respect, con dence, and a “can-do” culture. The military 
operates a rigid hierarchical authority system, but while the 
“mission aim”  ows down to front-line commanders, they are 
nevertheless empowered to use their initiative, and be creative 
in securing tactical objectives. Military operational resilience 
is built around  exibility and adaptability, representing the 
very same Darwinian determinants highlighted as critical 
for species’ survivability when encountering dynamic and 
uncertain environments. The military seek to engender 
inclusivity, whereby all service personnel, irrespective of rank, 
race, gender, and religion, are granted equal opportunity to 
 ght and face the ultimate sacri ce for their regiment and 
country. There are lessons here for business, not least the 
need to encroach further into the business-battle space and 
emulate the key attributes of military operational resilience.
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